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Summary  
Background: Isolating infectious patients is essential to reduce infection risk. Effectiveness 
depends on identifying them, transfer to suitable accommodation and maintaining precautions.   
 
Methods: Online study to address identification of infectious patients, transfer and challenges 
maintaining isolation in hospitals in the United Kingdom.  
 
Results: Forty nine responses were obtained. Decision to isolate is taken between 
infection prevention teams, clinicians and managers. Respondents reported 
situations where isolation was impossible because of the patient’s physical 
condition or cognitive status. Very sick patients and those with dementia were not 
thought to tolerate isolation well. Patients were informed about need for isolation 
by ward nurses, sometimes with explanation from infection prevention teams. 
Explanations were often poorly received and comprehended, fuelling complaints. 
Respondents were aware of ethical dilemmas associated with isolation undertaken 
in the interests of other health service users and society. Organisational failures 
could delay instigating isolation. Records were kept of demand for isolation 
and/or uptake but quality was variable.  
 
Conclusion: Isolation has received greatest attention in countries with under-
provision of accommodation. Our study demonstrates reasons for delays 
identifying patients and isolation failure placing others at risk that apply in any 
organisation regardless of availability and highlights ethical dilemmas of enforcing 
isolation.  
 
Words in summary 197 
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Introduction 
Isolation is the segregation of infectious/potentially infectious patients to prevent 
transmission of antibiotic resistant pathogens, highly contagious pathogens and 
those causing serious infection and those who are at particular risk of infection, 
such as neutropenic patients (1). It is integral to any infection prevention 
programme but in some countries, notably the United Kingdom (UK) and much of 
Europe isolation accommodation is in short supply, with competition from patients 
who are noisy and those receiving end of life care (2, 3, 4, 5). Even where single 
rooms are the norm in general wards, patients who are most sick and on 
specialist units (e.g. critical care) are often nursed in shared areas to facilitate 
observation. Single rooms are sometimes assumed to reduce infection risk but 
evidence of ability to contain spread is equivocal (6, 7 ) and a recent study in an 
all-single-room hospital has not demonstrated lower infection rates than hospitals 
where most care is in open bays (8). Pathogens spread by airborne and contact 
routes contaminate general ward areas (9). Possible reasons are breaches in 
isolation: doors left open failure to cleanse hands or use personal protective 
equipment (PPE) and patients leaving the room (5). Failure to identify 
infectious/potentially infectious patients and inefficient procedures to transfer 
them to isolation accommodation might also contribute but no studies to explore 
these issues appear to have been reported, although transmission from 
asymptomatic patients is likely (10).  
 
Methods 
We explored procedures to identify infectious/potentially infectious patients and 
transfer to isolation accommodation in UK hospitals. It was planned in conjunction 
with an Expert Panel of five infection prevention leads in National Health Service 
(NHS) trusts selected because of their experience and interest in isolation, the 
NHS being the UK public health system which is largely free at the point of care, 
and which is used by most UK citizens, each of which has a lead clinician 
responsible for infection control. They helped decide questions, format of the data 
collection tool and commented on findings. Open questions were used because of 
the lack of previous research concerning isolation (11). They generate less 
standardised data than fixed response formats and are more challenging to 
analyse but avoid risk of obtaining responses perceived to be expected or 
desirable (12). Questions were sent to potential respondents electronically via 
their professional networks adopting an approach called ‘purposive sampling’ (13) 
to obtain ‘rich information’ from individuals targeted because they can provide 
detailed information about the topic of enquiry (14).  This method can obtain 
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qualitative data as effectively as conventional survey methods (15). The study 
was classified as a quality improvement initiative not requiring ethical approval.  
 
Data from each question and from across the dataset were analysed inductively 
using conventional content analysis to generate codes based on recurrent themes 
(16). Coding was undertaken independently by two members of the research 
team with third party arbitration in cases of disagreement. The frequency that 
codes appeared was documented to quantify key information (17).   
 
Results 
Forty nine responses were obtained. Size of employing organisation varied and 
estimates were given rather than precise numbers. One was an 18 bed facility 
providing end of life care, one was a 20 bed private hospital and two specialised 
in mental health. The remainder were large acute general NHS trusts with up to 
2,000 beds admitting elective and emergency cases. Median number of beds was 
708 (interquartile range 250-1,000). Number of patients requiring isolation 
varied: in a typical acute NHS trust with 1,000-2000 beds 100-200 patients were 
reported to need isolating for infection per month. One respondent gave very 
precise information. In an organisation with 500 beds, 75 patients required 
isolation on the day of data collection. Thirty five (71.4%) respondents reported 
lack of isolation facilities as a major problem. Even where cubicles were available 
they often lacked en suite facilities. There was no statistically significant 
relationship between size of organisation and reported ability to find isolation 
accommodation for the 48 units reporting these data (Exact Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
Test: W = 86.5, p=0.07). Logistic regression of bed numbers against reported 
ability also failed to show any significant relationship: OR =1, 95 CI 0.99 to 1 
p=0.137. Only two (4.1%) respondents reported never having difficulties finding 
isolation accommodation. They were employed in newly refurbished premises 
with a high proportion of single en suite facilities. The remainder described 
‘putting up barriers’ in open bays, cohort nursing or using temporary isolation 
‘pods’. Solutions were reached through prioritisation when more than one patient 
needed a single room, although only four (8.2%) respondents reported using a 
formal prioritisation tool. Two respondents worked in organisations soon to be 
refurbished with more isolation rooms. Another worked in a newly refurbished 
facility where opportunity to increase single room capacity had not been taken 
when upgrading was commissioned.   
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Potential need for isolation was initially identified by clinical staff (n= 21, 42.8%), 
the infection prevention team (n=15, 30.6%), jointly between both (n=12, 
24.55%) and in one case according to local policy. There was no relationship 
between staff responsible for decision-making and size of organisation (Kruskal-
Wallis: H=1.77, df 3 p=0.62). Shared decision-making was complex and drew on 
multiple sources of information with communication between infection prevention 
teams, clinicians (mainly nurses) and laboratory staff. A typical response is 
reproduced below:  
 
‘Results are made available to clinical staff (either from the lab or reported by 
infection prevention staff or microbiologists). We use an ‘isolation matrix’ within 
trust policy to guide the decision. The infection prevention team is used as a 
resource to provide advice about isolation, particularly when prioritisation is 
required.’  The policy referred to here being the hospital or organisations infection 
control policy. 
 
Multifaceted decision making typically involved 3-4 different approaches per 
response. The most commonly mentioned were risk assessment (n=17, 28.8% 
reports), additional, more involved discussion between clinicians and infection 
prevention teams (n=16, 32.6% reports) and assessing clinical symptoms (n=15, 
30.6% reports). Eight (16.3%) obtained a history from the patient or family 
suggesting high risk of infection (e.g. recent overseas travel, admission from a 
nursing home or transfer from another hospital with a known cluster of 
infections). Availability of isolation accommodation and alerts on patients’ paper 
or electronic records were each identified seven (14.3%) times. Four respondents 
(8.1%) mentioned use of an isolation prioritisation tool. Mode of transmission was 
considered important in three responses (6.1%): in these accounts patients 
suspected to have airborne infection received priority. One respondent considered 
‘local epidemiology’ in decision-making. Emergency patients represented the 
greatest challenge. Wherever possible they were moved to a cubicle in the 
emergency department or straight to ward isolation accommodation. Thirty 
respondents (61.2%) reported ‘bed shuffling’ between frontline staff, infection 
prevention teams and bed managers to locate suitable accommodation. Where 
prioritisation tools were used, they were perceived to be especially valuable 
during bed shuffling. 
 
Final decision to isolate was made by the infection prevention team in nine 
(18.4%) organisations, clinicians in three organisations (6.1%) and according to 
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trust policy in one organisation. In the remaining 36 (73.4%) joint decisions were 
reached between infection prevention teams, clinicians (usually nurses) and staff 
responsible for bed management. Clinicians took greater responsibility for less 
complex cases featuring patients with more commonly encountered pathogens 
and at night and weekends when the infection prevention team was less 
available. One respondent explained how their team provided education to 
clinicians to enable them to make decisions safely. It was usually possible to 
identify patients with meticillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and 
Clostridium difficile through alerts on the notes but not other less commonly 
encountered pathogens, especially when differential diagnosis was possible. 
Delays obtaining laboratory reports or patients not giving a complete history on 
admission occasionally resulted in delay. Nearly half (46.9%) respondents 
reported communication problems causing delays with housekeeping services, 
delivery of PPE, other equipment necessary to ‘put up barriers’ and isolation signs 
for doors.  
 
Deciding to isolate and ability to sustain isolation depended on patient-related 
factors in addition to risk of spreading infection: acute illness or behavioural 
issues could result in a decision not to isolate or once instigated, isolation 
procedures breaking down:   
 
‘Managing patients safely in isolation impacts on our ability to isolate, especially 
in critical care.’ 
 
‘Due to mental health problems some patients are unable to comply with 
restrictions. In this case … arrangements are put into place to allow limited 
access to designated ward areas (outside the room) under supervision.’ 
 
Respondents from organisations admitting large numbers of patients with 
cognitive impairment were aware that legislation in the UK prevents them being 
detained against their will unless it is their own best interests to be protected 
from harm, pointing out that this could prevent isolation being instigated if such 
patients were unwilling or unable to co-operate.  
 
Respondents were asked what happened once the decision to isolate had been 
made and occurrences of isolation failure. They reported that the ‘alert’ status of 
elective patients was usually known before admission, allowing ward staff to plan 
in advance. They were aware that ward staff sometimes failed to check or 
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overlooked electronic alerts. Ward staff favoured alternative explanations to 
infection where these were plausible: they were more ready to attribute 
gastrointestinal symptoms to diet or overuse of aperients than infection. This was 
attributed to concern about moving patients outside their clinical speciality:  
 
‘If patients have complex care needs, moving them out of their specialist area to 
get an isolation room brings safety risks.’  
 
Patients and families were told about the need for isolation by ward staff, 
sometimes with additional explanation by the infection prevention team. There 
was no relationship between staff responsible for giving information and size of 
organisation (Kruskal-Wallis: H=1.27, df 2 p=0.53). Explanation was usually 
given verbally but leaflets were mentioned by a few respondents. There was 
evidence that information-giving could be improved. For example, poor 
understanding was a frequent cause of patient complaints and explaining 
necessity for isolation was often omitted: 
 
‘The clinicians are responsible for explaining the need for isolation … although in 
reality it often doesn’t happen. The patient is moved into a single room and no-
one explains why.’ 
 
Giving information could be challenging: 
 
‘Some patients do not tolerate isolation well - those who are confused. They have 
to be given information about what isolation involves to work out if they will 
tolerate it.’    
 
Discontinuing isolation involved similar processes to the initial decision to isolate 
and as before was often pragmatic, based on availability of accommodation. It 
was generally less complex however: nature of the infection was established and 
for some infections there were clear pathogen-specific ‘rules’ (e.g. obtaining 
negative swabs on consecutive, pre-determined number of occasions).  
 
Over half the organisations failed to maintain records of patients needing or 
receiving isolation. Detailed records were kept in five (10.2%) organisations. 
These respondents were confident they could extract precise data. Eighteen 
(36.7%) attempted to maintain records but admitted they were of variable 
quality and utility. Information documented varied. Some organisations audited 
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uptake of single rooms, others uptake by infectious patients either manually or 
with electronic surveillance systems developed in-house or available 
commercially. There was some confusion about ability of commercial systems to 
generate isolation data. One respondent was confident they could extract reliable 
information while others using the same system thought that such data could not 
be obtained without considerable user effort or would be impossible to extract. 
Four (8.1%) respondents audited records and of these one undertook root cause 
analysis which demonstrated that failure to isolate patients with MRSA and C. 
difficile seldom occurred. In other organisations failure to isolate was supposed to 
be recorded as a patient safety incident but was often overlooked. 
 
When invited to state how isolation could be improved 63.9% (n=32) 
respondents suggested better accommodation: more single rooms with en suite 
facilities. Education of ward staff and better communication between services 
were each mentioned seven times (14.3%). Improved audit to document demand 
and use of isolation accommodation and availability of a prioritisation tool were 
each mentioned three times (6.1%).  
 
Discussion  
Effectiveness of isolation depends on the pathogen concerned and clinicians’ 
adherence to isolation precautions once isolation has been initiated (18, 19). Ours 
appears to be the first study exploring procedures used to identify infectious 
patients, organisational and ethical issues. Although of particular interest in 
countries where under-provision of isolation facilities is challenging (2, 3, 4, 5), 
its findings are of wider interest. Isolation involves much more than 
accommodating patients in single rooms. Recent evidence suggests that they 
have no impact on infection rates (8) and do not prevent contamination of 
general ward areas (9). As in previous studies that have collected qualitative data 
in online surveys we obtained a good volume of in-depth data (16). We 
established multiple reasons for isolation failure that help explain these findings. 
They are pertinent to any organisation where isolation might be necessary, 
regardless of availability of accommodation. Isolation imposes ‘costs’ on patients 
in terms of liberty and human rights for public health benefit (20), as well as the 
benefits of  privacy, personal storage, and an individualised environment (21). 
Unless identified before or soon after arrival, infectious patients may occupy 
communal admission areas, use shared facilities (e.g. dining and day rooms) or 
receive treatment in common areas. Problems are compounded with 
asymptomatic patients (10) and will increase as a result of demographic trends: 
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asymptomatic carriage is most prevalent in older people who are the most 
frequent recipients of health care. In particular, asymptomatic carriage of C. 
difficile is linked to use of proton pump inhibitors and is likely to increase because 
they are used to counteract side-effects of non-steroidal inflammatory analgesia 
for chronic pain (22) and there are more patients having immunosuppressive 
treatments.  
 
We established that ward staff frequently identify need for isolation. They are not 
always well equipped to identify infectious patients, placing others in the hospital 
environment at risk. Educating frontline staff is important but it is unrealistic to 
expect them to identify patients who have less commonly encountered 
pathogens, especially when differential diagnosis is possible. For many pathogens 
mode of transmission is still debated. There is emerging evidence that those 
traditionally thought to be spread by contact are also transmitted by droplet and 
aerosol while pathogens spread by airborne routes can also be spread by contact 
(23). Decision-making in relation to isolation should be a multidisciplinary activity 
with close liaison between clinical and specialist infection prevention teams, 
especially when it is necessary to prioritise isolation accommodation. Greater 
involvement of infection prevention teams could also help avoid communication 
failures between the many departments that help organise isolation.  
 
An additional complication is that of official targets such as those in the UK that 
state that 95% of patients attending A&E departments should be discharged, 
admitted or transferred within four hours of their arrival (24). While this is clearly 
beneficial for most patients, and improves the quality of the service it may also 
lead to rushed decisions. Other pertinent managerial issues would appear to 
include staffing levels, the availability of equipment to prevent sharing between 
patients, and adequate levels of cleaning services. Although not specified by 
statutory or professional regulators most nursing staff would have mandatory 
annual training in infection control, and have a professional responsibility to 
remain trained and competent in this area (25). 
 
In addition to the above findings this study has identified important issues 
concerning education of patients and the public and highlighted tension between 
need to involve patients and families in decisions about care and wider safety-
related issues (26, 27). Isolation is intended to protect health service users, staff 
and the public but may conflict with what patients consider to be their best 
interests and can have negative consequences. Isolated patients experience more 
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depression, anxiety, adverse events and make more complaints than the general 
patient population (28). The findings of this study corroborate earlier research 
showing they do not tolerate isolation well (29) They may resent the loneliness of 
enforced incarceration, relatives having to wear PPE especially if staff do not 
adhere to infection prevention precautions and impact of isolation on 
opportunities for rehabilitation outside the room (e.g. physiotherapy). Decision to 
isolate introduces ethical dilemmas: balancing its benefits and risks for individuals 
against needs of the wider population; the extent that healthcare users should be 
informed of these risks and can be expected to share responsibility for controlling 
them; of a causal evidence base on which to base isolation decisions; how to 
prioritise resources; and the extent that staff have an obligation to care for 
patients with potentially transmissible diseases (30). 
 
Antisocial behaviour associated with poor adherence and increasing incidence of 
dementia and delirium in the aging and acutely sick populations are challenges 
that need addressing by multidisciplinary teams, with infection prevention 
specialists playing a major role. Our findings suggest that clinical staff would 
welcome greater support from infection prevention teams when it is necessary to 
explain need for isolation to patients and families. International policy emphasises 
the need for all health workers, patients and the wider public to be aware of the 
risks of antimicrobial resistance and the importance of infection prevention to 
contain it (31, 32). The best way of educating lay people about their contribution 
including isolation, is an issue that policy-makers and infection prevention experts 
have yet to address. Preventing infection and reducing risk of antimicrobial 
resistance requires people to understand the balance between what suits the 
individual and the interests of other patients and society. Staff and patients need 
to be convinced that their actions will make a difference (21).  
 
In the UK under-provision of isolation accommodation should eventually be 
reduced by national policy to increase single room provision to at least 50% in all 
new hospital buildings (33) but our findings indicate that many of the other 
challenges will be ongoing. Local guidance states that the provision of single-bed 
rooms with en-suite sanitary facilities is vital for effective isolation (34), however 
in countries such as the UK there has been a historic shortfall in this provision in 
public hospitals compared to private hospitals in the UK and more generally 
elsewhere (21).  In the UK and other countries where accommodation is in short 
supply, it may be helpful to audit demand and supply to inform commissioning 
when new buildings are planned and providing commercially available isolation 
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‘pods’ at times of greatest pressure.  The facilities required for single-rooms 
might include en-suite sanitary facilities; a  lobby or space  for personal 
protective equipment and its disposal;  basins for handwashing in the room and 
in the lobby; the ability to observe the patient; and facilities to improve the 
patient experience such as windows.  For those with airborne infections adequate 
ventilation is also needed (35). Prioritisation tools can enhance decision-making 
but must be quick and straightforward to apply. They were not widely used in our 
study perhaps because application can be complex and time-consuming although 
they were valued in organisations where they had been implemented.  Other 
strategies might include cohorting of patients with the same infection, but this 
calls for a discrete cohort area and a relatively high level of decision making due 
to the resources involved such as potentially ‘blocking’ empty beds to new 
admissions. 
 
Study limitations 
Extracting numerical values from data generated by open questions is a valuable 
means of quantification in exploratory studies but does not equate with more 
precise measurement possible with large scale, randomised surveys (17). 
Purposive samples can reduce external validity but have the advantage of 
increasing depth and quality of data and increased the credibility of our findings 
(14). Content analysis can jeopardise external validity if key information is 
missing from the data (16). Members of the Expert Panel independently agreed 
that our findings reflected their experience of how decisions about isolation are 
undertaken however, and corroborated the challenges of isolation reported by 
respondents. Many respondents commented on the importance of the study and 
the lack of information and facilities to support isolation and all supplied detailed 
information, supporting completeness and validity of the data. Range of 
healthcare organisations represented was wide (acute, mental health and 
community facilities) further increasing external validity.   
    
CONCLUSION  
Isolation has received greatest attention in countries with under-provision of 
accommodation but there are many reasons for isolation failure that apply in all 
organisations regardless of availability. These need to be addressed. Important 
issues revealed in our study are the moral and ethical dilemmas associated with 
segregating acutely ill and frail older people in the wider interests of health 
service users and society and the imperative to educate patients and the public 
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about their contribution to infection prevention and containing risks of 
antimicrobial resistance. 
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